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Casenote
Employer Beware: Changing the
Landscape of Employment
Discrimination Claims at the
Summary Judgment Stage*
I. INTRODUCTION

In Quigg v. Thomas County School District,' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit changed the summary judgment
framework for mixed-motive employment discrimination cases. The
ruling in Quigg will affect both employers and employees and will lead to
more mixed-motive discrimination claims reaching the jury, rather than
being dismissed through summary judgment. The newly-adopted
framework takes the burden-shifting standard out of summary
judgment, and many commentators consider it a much more plaintifffriendly framework. 2 Under the new framework, in order to survive a
motion for summary judgment on a mixed-motive discrimination claim,
all the plaintiff must do is show that a protected characteristic was a
3
"motivating factor" for an adverse employment action. This standard is
significantly lower than the standard that was previously used in the

*I owe a great deal of gratitude to Professor John P. Cole. Between our conversations
about the Cubs winning the World Series and SEC football, he provided insight into both
the fundamental elements and intricate parts of employment discrimination law. His
guidance and expertise made this Casenote possible.
1. 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016).
2. Id. at 1240. See, e.g., Christopher J. Emden, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell
Douglas, White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in MixedMotive Cases, 1 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 139, 141 (2010)
3. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239.
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Eleventh Circuit, 4 and it does not force the plaintiff to point to one "true"
reason that led to the employment discrimination.5
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2007, Linda Quigg (Quigg) became the superintendent for the
Thomas County School District in Thomasville, Georgia. In appointing
Quigg, the Thomas County School Board (School Board) gave her a threeyear contract. In 2008, the School Board extended her contract by one
year, with the contract expiring in 2011. Although Quigg received
satisfactory or above-satisfactory performance ratings by the School
Board during these years, a tumultuous relationship existed between
Quigg and members of the School Board. In one instance, Quigg openly
supported opponents of current School Board members during elections.
In addition, other members of the school district had ethics concerns
regarding Quigg's administration of school programs. 6
The School Board, which was made up of seven people, was set to meet
in February 2011 to discuss the possibility of renewing Quigg's contract
for another year. Prior to this meeting, two members of the School Board,
Scott Morgan (Morgan) and Mark Nesmith (Nesmith) had approached
Quigg to discuss her role within the school district. Morgan and Nesmith
advised Quigg that she should consider getting a male assistant
superintendent in order to "handle" things. After Quigg refused the
suggestion, Morgan and Nesmith voiced their opinion to both Quigg and
other employees of the school district that it was time for a male to take
over as superintendent. At Quigg's contract renewal meeting, the School
Board voted five-to-two against Quigg. Morgan and Nesmith were among
the people that voted against Quigg. After the vote, Nancy (Hiers), who
also voted against Quigg, told a school district employee that she had
voted against Quigg because she believed a male was needed for the job. 7
Following the vote against Quigg, the School Board relieved Quigg of
her duties as superintendent. 8 Quigg then filed both a Title VII claim
under the Civil Rights Act of 19649 and a discrimination and retaliation
claim under Section 1983.10 Quigg named as defendants the School
District and all the board members who had voted against her.11 Quigg
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1998).
See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397 (6th Cir. 2008).
Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1233.
Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1234.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e.17 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1234.
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pointed to the comments made by members of the School Board to show
that illegal bias had been a motivating factor in the decision to not renew
her contract. Before trial began, the defendants filed and were granted a
motion for summary judgment. The trial court held that Quigg had only
presented circumstantial evidence of discrimination and did not raise a
triable issue. 12 Using the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
14
v. Green,13 the trial court held that summary judgment was proper.
After the ruling from the trial court, Quigg appealed to the Eleventh
15
Circuit Court of Appeals.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Early Years: Civil Rights Act of 1964 and McDonnell Douglas
The evolution of employment discrimination claims traces its roots to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 It was then that Congress attempted to
combat discrimination in the United States by enacting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. 17 Among other things, Title VII created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and made it illegal for
employers to "discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."18 Title VII not only extends to hiring and termination
19
decisions, but also to employment promotion and demotion decisions.
Congress recognized at the time it enacted Title VII that minorities and
historically-disadvantaged groups needed protection in order to ensure
they were extended equal opportunities to succeed in and become assets
to society. 20 In a 1971 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized that Congress was making a stand against "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate" because of race, color, religion, sex,
21
or national origin.

12. Id.
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1234-35.
15. Id. at 1235.
16. See Emden, supra note 2, at 142.
17. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
19. Brian H. Alligood, Proof of Racial Discrimination in Employment Promotion
Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF
OF FACTS 3D (1998).
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 796.
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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After the enactment of Title VII, the Supreme Court had to decide the
best way to implement the policies in employment discrimination cases. 22
In 1973, the Court addressed the issue in the seminal case of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.23 In McDonnell Douglas, an African-American
man brought suit against his former employer for rejecting his
reemployment application. After the case was heard by the trial and
appellate courts, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining the
correct framework for employment discrimination cases. 24 The Supreme
Court held that an employee has the initial burden under Title VII of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 25 The Court held
that the employee can show prima facie discrimination by proving the
following factors:
[they] belong[] to a racial minority;
that [they] applied and [were] qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants;
that, despite [their] qualifications, [they were] rejected; and
that, after [their] rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 26

If the employee could successfully make this initial showing, the
burden of persuasion then shifted to the employer to show some
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. 27 If
the employer was able make this showing, the burden shifted back to the
employee to prove that they were the victim of discrimination. 28 The
employee had to make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence. 29
Typically, an employee would attempt to show that the employer's reason
for rejection was pretext, or that the employer was not justified in making
the decision. 30

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 798-99.
Id.
Id. at 796-98.
Id. at 796-802.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 803.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003).
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
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This back-and-forth burden-shifting adopted in McDonnell Douglas
became the standard for most employment discrimination cases.31
Although the Supreme Court never required lower courts to use the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework at the summary
judgment phase, many courts still looked to the case for guidance. 32 In
the years following McDonnell Douglas, lower courts used the burdenshifting scheme as the dominant tool both at summary judgment and at
trial when dealing with employment discrimination cases.33 Thus, even
though the Supreme Court left the option open for circuit courts to create
their own standard for summary judgment, many circuit courts
continued to rely on the Supreme Court's decision from McDonnell

Douglas.
After the Court adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework, many
commentators began to classify McDonnell Douglas as harsh and
unforgiving for plaintiffs. 34 One commentator described the framework
as a gatekeeper, barring legitimate plaintiffs from reaching the jury. 35
Many plaintiffs who would otherwise have strong claims could not
survive the rebuttable summary judgment framework because they could
not prove that the employer's reasoning was pretext. 36 For many
plaintiffs alleging illegal discrimination, a defendant's motion for
summary judgment would result in the plaintiffs claims being
dismissed. 37 The disposal of these claims at the summary judgment stage
deprived plaintiffs of the more fair decision-making assured by a
factfinder's decision at trial. 38 As a result, the presumed intent of
Congress was frustrated for over two decades after the enactment of Title
VII in 1964.39 Federal courts, in an attempt to help protect employee
plaintiffs, began creating their own standards to be used for employment
40
discrimination at the summary judgment stage.

31. See Emden, supra note 2, at 143.
32. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (2008).
33. See Emden, supranote 2, at 144.
34. See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109,
111 (2007).
35. See Emden, supranote 2, at 140.
36. Id. Proving something is pretext requires the employee to discredit the employer's
reasoning by illustrating that the employer's reason given is not the real reason for the
employment discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 25253 (1981).
37. See Emden, supra note 2, at 147.
38. Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 208-09 (1993).
39. Id.
40. Emden, supranote 2, at 153.
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B. Mixed-Motive Claims and the Type of Evidence Necessary
When Congress passed Title VII in 1964, there was only one type of
employment discrimination claim: single-motive. 41 Over the years since
the enactment, the Supreme Court has recognized a second type of
employment discrimination claim: mixed-motive. 42 Single-motive
discrimination claims are hard for an employee to prove because the
adverse employment action must be predicated on one illegal reason. 43 In
contrast, an employee can succeed on a mixed-motive discrimination
claim by showing that illegal bias based on sex or race was a motivating
factor for an adverse employment action, even though there might be
other factors that also motivated the action. 44
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,45 which the United States Supreme
Court decided in 1989, was the first case in which the Court
distinguished the different types of employment discrimination claims
under Title VII.46 While the distinction may have seemed subtle, it would
change the landscape of employment discrimination cases. No longer did
an employee have to point to one true reason for the employer's
discriminatory motive. Instead, an employer could be held liable for
adverse employment decisions based on a mixture of lawful and unlawful
motives. 47 In other words, even if the employer had a legitimate reason
for the employment action, the employer could still be found liable for
employment discrimination if the employee could prove that the
defendant also considered an impermissible factor at the time the
employment decision was made. 48
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was a candidate for partnership
with her company. 49 However, after Hopkins did not make partner, she
sued her employer for employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.50 The Supreme Court held that the standard for
proving mixed-motive discrimination claims is similar to the burden-

41. See Maya R. Warrier, Dare to Step Out of the Fogg: Single-Motive Versus MixedMotive Analysis in Title VII Employment DiscriminationCases, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv.

409, 411 (2008).
42. Id. at 413.
43. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235.
44. Id.

45. 490 U.S. 228 (2014).
46. Id. at 240; see also White, 533 F.3d at 396.
47. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
48. Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess: Defining and Applying a Mixed-Motive
Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461, 463 (2011).
49. 490 U.S. at 231.
50. Id.
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shifting framework used in McDonnell Douglas.51 This meant that,
initially, Hopkins had the burden of proof in persuading the factfinder
that her employer had discriminated against her.52 After Hopkins was
successful in this showing, the burden shifted to her employer to
persuade the factfinder that, even if it had not taken the protected class
into account (here, that Hopkins was a female), the same outcome would
have resulted. 53 In other words, Hopkins's employers had to justify
decision by showing they would have taken the same course of action
against Hopkins even if she was not part of a protected class. 54
The recognition of mixed-motive claims is not the only noteworthy part
of the Price Waterhouse decision. In a famous concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that in order for a mixed-motive discrimination claim
to have standing, the employee must use direct evidence to prove their
claim.55 Justice O'Connor believed that, in order to justify shifting the
burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment
plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was
a substantial factor in the decision.5 6 The effect of Justice O'Connor's
concurrence was that many employees failed to survive the summary
judgment stage because they could not prove their case by producing
direct evidence.5 7 Direct evidence of discriminatory animus is rare,
because employers will almost never admit to a hiring decision that was
based on a protected characteristic.5 8 Because of this, most plaintiffs can
only prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence.59 As a result,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence stifled many employees' claims because
the employees could not point to direct evidence that their employer had
60
discriminated against them.

Displeased with the direct-evidence rule from the Price Waterhouse
decision, Congress attempted to alleviate the situation by passing the
Civil Rights Act of 199161 to supersede the Supreme Court decision. 62

51. Id. at 252.
52. Id. at 246.
53. Id. at 244-45.
54. Id. at 248.
55. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Sarah Keates, Surviving Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases, 78 U. CIN. L.
REV. 785, 797-98 (2009).
58. Id. at 787.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 797-98.
61. 42 U.S.C. § (2000)(e) (1991).
62. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94.

1152

MERCER LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 68

The relevant part of the act discussing the type of evidence necessary
holds:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice. 63
Although Congress intended to discredit the direct evidence rule, it did
not initially succeed in its mission.6 4 Because this section was silent on
whether direct or circumstantial evidence could be used to prove that an
employer had discriminated against an employee, courts were in
disagreement about whether the employee could use circumstantial
evidence or had to use direct evidence. 65 Many courts continued to rely
on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion from Price Waterhouse.66 As a
result, for the first decade after the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, many federal courts required a Title VII plaintiff asserting a mixedmotive claim to produce direct evidence in order to prove their employer
had discriminated against them.67 Because of this requirement,
employees repeatedly had cases dismissed at the summary judgment
stage.6 8
In 2003, however, the Supreme Court ended this split among circuit
courts by holding that mixed-motive discrimination claims could be based
on circumstantial evidence.6 9 The Supreme Court rejected Justice
O'Connor's reasoning from Price Waterhouse, and held in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa70 that mixed-motive discrimination claims do not have to be
based on direct evidence, instead holding mixed-motive claims could be
based on either direct or circumstantial evidence.7 1 The Court based its
ruling on the legislative intent of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 72
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
64. See Emden, supra note 216, at 149.
65. DesertPalace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 95.
66. See Emden, supra note 2, at 146.
67. White, 533 F.3d at 397. As a result, and not surprisingly, there were not many
mixed-motive discrimination claims during this time period. It is very rare to have direct
evidence of employment discrimination. As such, Justice O'Connor's direct evidence rule
stifled mixed-motive employment discrimination claims until 2003. See Emden, supra note
2.
68. See Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1236.
69. See Keates, supra note 57, at 790.
70. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
71. Id. at 101-02.
72. Id. at 97.
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In Desert Palace, a female equipment operator, Catharina Costa, was
fired after she got into an altercation with a male coworker. 73 Costa then
filed a lawsuit against her former employer for employment
discrimination and sexual harassment. After the jury returned a verdict
for Costa, Desert Palace appealed the decision on the basis the trial court
erred by giving erroneous jury instructions. The trial court judge failed
to instruct members of the jury that Costa must show she was
discriminated against by direct evidence. 74 The Supreme Court in this
case rejected the employer's argument that the 1991 statute required
there be direct evidence to prove mixed-motive discrimination claims.75
The Court held that, because the 1991 Civil Rights statute was silent on
the type of evidence that was needed to prove a discrimination case,
either direct or circumstantial evidence could be used. 76
In the years since the Desert Palace decision, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld this precedent allowing an employee to use
circumstantial evidence to show employment discrimination. 77 Although
Desert Palace extended Title VII employment discrimination claims to
cases based on circumstantial evidence, it did not resolve the question of
the proper summary judgment framework. Because of this, and because
the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, the correct summary
judgment framework has been left to the lower courts to resolve.7 8
C. Sixth Circuit Leads the Way with the White Framework
Although the Desert Palace decision made clear the type of evidence
necessary, the Court was silent on what type of summary-judgment
framework the circuit courts needed to use.7 9 As a result, federal circuit
courts developed differing approaches.80 In 2008, with still no guidance
from the Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit created what has come to be known as the White test.8 1 In doing

73. Id. at 95.
74. Id. at 96-97.
75. Id. at 101.
76. Id.
77. Thomas Kondro, Mixed Motives and Motivating Factors: Choosing a Realistic
Summary Judgment Framework for § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1439,
1445 (2010). However, some circuit courts have found that Desert Palace only applies to
jury instructions, not to the correct framework at summary judgment. See Griffith v. City
of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (2004).
78. Id.
79. White, 533 F.3d at 399.
80. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1238-39.
81. White, 533 F.3d at 400.
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so, the Sixth Circuit set a precedent that would eventually be followed by
the Eleventh Circuit. 82
In White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,83 an African-American
pharmaceutical salesman, Todd White, filed a claim against his former
employer stating that he was denied a promotion because of his race. 84
White used evidence to show that his experience with the company and
the number of sales he made should have garnered him a promotion.
Instead of promoting White, however, White's employer demoted him and
took away his benefits. At trial, the district court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment, holding that White had not adequately
demonstrated that his employer had discriminated against him. After
appealing the decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the
trial court's grant of the employer's summary judgment motion, holding
that the trial court had incorrectly relied on the McDonnell Douglas
framework in reaching its decision. 85
In rejecting the McDonnell Douglas framework, this court recognized
that the framework was suitable for single-motive discrimination
claims. 8 8 However, the court also noted that a better framework was need
for mixed-motive discrimination claims. 8 7 The court held that the

McDonnell Douglas summary judgment standard created an
unnecessary burden on the plaintiff.88 The McDonnell Douglas
framework required that the employee point to one true reason for the
adverse employment action. 89 However, in mixed-motive discrimination
cases, a plaintiff will never have to point to one true, ultimate reason for
the employer's discrimination.90 Instead, once an employee brings
evidence of an illegitimate motivating factor, the employee has no
responsibility to eliminate the employer's proffered legitimate reason for
the adverse employment decision. 9 ' In essence, the plaintiff could win at
the summary judgment stage just by simply showing that the defendant's
consideration of a Title VII protected characteristic was a motivating
factor for the adverse action. 92
82. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239.
83. 533 F.3d 381 (2008).
84. Id. at 384.
85. Id. at 385-89.
86. Id. at 400.
87. Id. at 401.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Kondro, supranote 77, at 1459. The line of thinking here is that "no amount of
legitimate reasons can entirely offset the illegitimate motivating factor." Id.
92. White, 533 F.3d at 400.
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After rejecting the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court laid out
what the plaintiff needed to produce in order to survive a motion for
summary judgment:
(1) [that] the defendant took an adverse employment action against
the plaintiff; and
(2) [R]ace, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motiving factor
for the defendant's adverse employment action.93
Commentators held that this change not only cured the defects of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, but created a much more employeefriendly summary judgment proceeding.94 As one commentator said,
'McDonnell Douglas creates a heightened burden for plaintiffs to meet at
summary judgment . . . ."95 White, on the other hand, "effectively
removes any burden on a plaintiff necessary to survive an employer's
summary judgment motion."96
The court's reasoning in White for changing the summary judgment
proceedings was to protect plaintiffs bringing a Title VII discrimination
claim.97 The court wanted to ensure that these plaintiffs had the
opportunity to submit their claim to a jury where they had illustrated
illegal bias as a motivating factor for an adverse employment action.98
The court held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
required the plaintiff to rebut every argument the employer presented.99
This burden-shifting rebuttable framework, according to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, was unnecessary at a summary judgment
proceeding.100 Instead, the court in White held that the ultimate question
with regard to summary judgment is whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact concerning the defendant's motivation for the
adverse employment action.101 The court in White answered this
question, and simplified the framework, by coming up with the two
questions mentioned above. 102 If the plaintiff could prove that a protected
characteristic was a factor in the employer's adverse employment action,

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 400-01.
See Emden, supra note 2, at 141.
Id.
Id.
See White, 533 F.3d at 402.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 400.
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the employer's motion for summary judgment had to be denied. 10 As
such, the employee was entitled to have the dispute resolved by a jury
trial. 104
IV. COURT's RATIONAL

In Quigg v. Thomas County School District, the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed de novo the trial court's decision to grant the employer's motion
for summary judgment. 105 Prior to this case, the Eleventh Circuit, like
many other circuits, used the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework at the summary judgment stage of mixed-motive claims.106
The Quigg decision, however, came at a time when many circuit courts
were moving away from the McDonnell Douglas framework. 107 As such,
Quigg presented the Eleventh Circuit with the opportunity to change the
summary judgment framework used in the Circuit. 108
The court in Quigg used a three-step approach to conclude that the
White framework was the correct one for summary judgment
proceedings.10 9 The court began its inquiry by discussing the legal
110
The court then
developments of mixed-motive discrimination claims.
considered the McDonnell Douglas framework that was currently being
used in the Eleventh Circuit. 1 1 After rejecting the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the court discussed the alternative possible summary
judgment frameworks to adopt before eventually deciding that the White
1 12
framework was the most promising.
A. Rejecting the McDonnell Douglas Framework
The judges in Quigg recognized that the issue presented before them
had never been decided by the Supreme Court, meaning there was no
binding precedent that had to be followed. 113 Although the Supreme
Court had held that McDonnell Douglas was proper for single motive
claims, it had never held that it must be used for mixed-motive

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 406.
Id.
Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235.
See id. at 1237.
Id. at 1238-39.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1237.
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discrimination claims. 114 As such, the Quigg court determined the
McDonnell Douglas framework was inadequate for mixed-motive
employment discrimination claims because it was predicated on proof of
115
The Quigg court said this
a single true reason for discrimination.
method was "inappropriate for evaluating mixed-motive claims because
116
it is overly burdensome when applied in the mixed-motive context."
Very similar to the court's reasoning in White, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the McDonnell Douglas framework was only proper for singlemotive claims. 117
In mixed-motive discrimination claims, like the claim in the present
case, the McDonnell Douglas framework was inconsistent with mixedmotive discrimination claims because, often, there will not be one true
reason for the discrimination. 118 In essence, the very nature of mixedmotive discrimination claims is that there will be multiple reasons for
the employer's discrimination. 119 Because of this, the court in Quigg held
that the McDonnell Douglas framework was improper for evaluating
mixed-motive claims at summary judgment.120
B. Accepting the White Standard
After holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework was inadequate,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide the appropriate
21
The court analyzed the different
summary judgment framework.1
before adopting the summary
circuits
sister
methods used by its
Circuit in White. 122 The Quigg
Sixth
the
by
judgment framework set forth
court held this approach was consistent with the mixed-motive theory of
discrimination and was supported by precedents from a number of other
circuits. 1 23 The court held that this framework was superior to McDonnell

Douglas, because it eliminated the burden-shifting that was present in
McDonnell Douglas. Instead, the court only had to address one question:
whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to conclude that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1238.
See id. at 1237.
Id. at 1238.
Id.
Id. at 1239.

Id.
Id.
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for an adverse employment action.124 This approach removed the burden
that employment discrimination plaintiffs previously had to carry at the
summary judgment stage. 125
In addition, the White framework was consistent with both Desert
Palace and the language of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 12 6 Both the
Supreme Court and Congress used language to indicate that if a plaintiff
could prove that they were discriminated against because of a protected
characteristic that was a motivating factor in the employer's decision,
that would be enough to survive a motion for summary judgment.1 27 The
Quigg court summarized its decision to adopt the White framework,
holding that "[the] White [framework] requires. . .a straightforward
inquiry into whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of [a]
mixed-motive discrimination to establish a jury issue."1 28
C. The Court'sRuling
In adopting the White framework, the Eleventh Circuit overruled the
trial court's dismissal of Quigg's discrimination claims.129 The court held
Quigg had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
her employer had used illegal bias in discriminating against her. Because
Quigg was able to produce circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination,
specifically the comments made by Nesmith, Morgan, and Heirs, the
court held that a jury issue existed as to whether illegal bias was a
motivating factor in the School Board's decision not to renew Quigg's
contract.13 0 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.1 3 1
V. IMPLICATIONS

For thirty years before Quigg v. Thomas County School District, the
Eleventh Circuit used the McDonnell Douglas framework for summary
judgment proceedings in Title VII mixed-motive discrimination claims.1 32
Although the McDonnell Douglas framework will still control for singlemotive discrimination claims, the White framework will now control for

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1240.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1245.
See id. at 1237.
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mixed-motive claims. 133 This decision allows an employee to more easily
survive the summary judgment stage, make it to trial, and even win at
trial.1 34 Quigg is also a warning to employers that they will have to view
employment discrimination cases differently in the future, as they can no
longer rely on winning under the McDonnell Douglas framework to win
in mixed-motive claims. Employers will likely have to be even more
careful and provide better documentation of hiring and promotion
decisions.1 35 At the very least, the framework should lead to the employee
having more leverage, which will create a more balanced relationship
between employers.
Although some commentators agree that the McDonnell Douglas
framework created an undue burden on the plaintiff at the summary
judgment stage, many scholars fear the White framework swings the
pendulum too far and will now create an undue burden on the defendant
at the summary judgment stage. 3 6 One scholar said that "this case
serves as a reminder that [an employer's] business decisions could
someday be evaluated in a courtroom. [An employer is] wise to carefully
evaluate and document [its] decisions, especially when an affected
37
employee is a member of a protected class."1 In at-will employment
states, employers will likely view this as an undue burden having to
document justifications for employment decision.
Another fear that employers have is that all plaintiffs in
discrimination cases will attempt to fit their claims into the mixedmotive theory because it could be easier to reach a jury under the White
138
While it
framework rather than the McDonnell Douglas framework.
may be true that surviving a motion for summary judgment under the
White framework is easier, it may not be beneficial for employees to try
and fit their claim into a mixed-motive theory. One commentator noted
that plaintiffs who eventually win at trial under a mixed-motive theory
usually get less damages than plaintiffs who win under a single motive
theory." 9 Because a plaintiffs damages could be greatly limited under a
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mixed-motive theory, some scholars believe this will counter the
incentive to turn to a mixed-motive claim.140
Even amidst any concerns the White framework will encounter in the
future, the Eleventh Circuit's departure from the McDonnell Douglas
framework should create stability and predictability in Title VII mixedmotive claims. 141 Because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
correct summary judgment framework for mixed-motive discrimination
claims, it is likely that other circuits will join the Eleventh Circuit in
adopting the White framework. One can only hope that the White
framework will lead to fewer employers making hiring and promotion
decisions based on illegal bias. However, because Congress and the
Supreme Court have failed to completely eradicate employment
discrimination in the past fifty years, it is unlikely that the White
framework will fully dismantle discrimination in the workplace. It will,
however, significantly help employees who believe they have been the
victims of illegal discrimination. At the very least, it should cause
employers to be more careful in their employment decisions. Because of
this, and because the goal of Congress since 1964 has been to eliminate
employment discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the White
framework will likely be viewed as a step in the right direction.
Matthew Bottoms
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